The Structure of Bargaining under the Employment Contracts Act by McAndrew, Ian
' 
• 
• 
• 
Nel1' Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 17(3): 259-282 
The Structure of Bargaining under the Employment 
C~ontracts Act 
Ian l\1cAndrew* 
Under ,che Enzploynzent Contracts Act 1991, the st~ucture ,of contracting is left for 
nego,tiarion be~~een the parties, rhetorically so that the parties can fashion mutually 
satisfactory arrange!1'zents attuned to their particular ne,eds and circumstances. This paper 
presents survey data that dernonstrates thatJ while the extent of employe,e concessions ~differs 
benveen individual and collective contr:actsJ patterns of contract structures are developing 
by 11•orkjorce size and pre-Act union strength and show no relationship to the market 
circunzstances or cost pr,essures under "'hich firms operate. 
"Decisions on bargaining structure are at the hean of the management of industrial 
relations" (Kinnie, 1987:463). The purpose of this paper is to report, through the 
presentation of research data, on the structure of bargaining, and associated contract 
structures, emerging under New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act of 1991. 
Introduction 
The New Zealand Employment Contracts Act 1991 has attracted considerable 
attention overseas because it represents such a significant depanure from established 
approaches to labour n1arket regulation in democratic industrialised societies. Fundamental 
to that departure is the denial of the premise that historically has underlaid and given 
rationale to industrial regulation: the presumed inequality of bargaining power between the 
individual employee and the employing organisation. 
Historically, Western governments have sought to regulate the labour market in one 
of two ways, or often in son1e variation of one or some combination of the two. The 
approaches have had in comn1on the objective of addressing the presumed inequality of 
bargaining power in the employment relationship. 
In the first approach, legislated procedures have been ~directed at neutralising the 
exercise of superior bargaining power, whether by employers or by combinations of 
en1ployees, by taking the setting of tet Ins and conditions of employment out of the hands 
of the imn1ediate employer and employee parties. This approach is n1ost obviously 
embodied in a centralised compulsory arbitration system, such as has operated in Australia, 
but it does not have to be. It can be compulsory or voluntary, centralised or decentralised, 
certain or contingent, definitive or parametrical, 'temporary or peunanent 
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The second approach has been directed not at neutralising the bargaining power of 
the parties, but rather at equalising it. Equality of bargaining power in the employment 
relationship has been legislatively promoted essentially by authorising employees to act 
collectively, at their option, in dealing with their employer and by requiring that the 
ernployer deal \vith employees collectively if the employees so choose. Again there can be 
variations, but the North American collective bargaining system can be seen as epitomising 
this approach. 
While the Australian system incorporates bargaining and the North American model 
incorporates some elements of neutral deteunination, the "E~opean model'', as represented 
for example by the Austrian social partnership system, might be seen as an illustration of 
the more complete integration of the two approaches. 
To reiterate, what unites these diverse approaches are the underlying presumption 
that the individual employee is not on equal footing with the employer when it comes to 
dete1rnining te1n1s and conditions of employment and, pursuant to that presumption, the 
attempt to legislatively address that presumed inequality. 
What funher unites the two approaches is that they both flow from a "pluralist" 
frame of reference as distinct from a "unitarist" frame of reference. They assume, that is 
to say, that while employers and employees have a common interest in the survival and 
prosperity of both the employing organisation and their relationship, they seek different 
things out of that relationship, and those d.iffer~ences will, to an extent, lead to conflict 
between them. Elements of cooperation and conflict co-exist in the employment 
relationship. From the pluralist perspective, this conflict is seen as natural and inevitable, 
and its resolution is central to industrial relations (see generally Geare, 1988:20-22). 
By contrast, the unitarist frame of reference casts conflict between employers and 
en1ployees as an indication of something gone wrong.: incompatible personalities, poor 
con1munications, incomprehension of the inherent community of interest between the parties, 
or the work of outside agitators (see generally Geare, 1988: 18-20}. 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 
How does the Employment Contracts Act relate to the two approaches incorporated 
within the pluralist philosophy? The most strident supporters of the Act would retreat 
behind the contention that the question is irrelevant because the pluralist analysis above is 
simply out of date. And, indeed, much of the rhetoric surrounding the introduction of the 
Act was unitarist in tone., asserting as it did that if outside union influence could simply 
be removed from the relationship between employers and employees, the immediate parties 
would recognise the essential identity of ttieir intefests and move forward together 
unmolested. In such a relationship, bargaining over div·erse interests is a non-event. 
But rhetoric is for romancing the masses and political power is for pragmatic 
application. The Employrnent Contracts Act was a piece of legislation masked in unitarist 
rhetoric, but it is decidedly not a piece of legislation built on a unitarist philosophy. It is 
a bargaining law and., as such, it is inherently pluralist. Where it departs from the 
bargaining model described above is in its denial of an inequality of bargaining power 
between the individual en1ployee or prospective employe~ and the employing organisation. 
Acknowledging no in1balance, the Act makes no effort to redress it. Accordingly, it gives 
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priority to individual bargaining and, while allowing for collective bargaining, does nothing 
to pron1ote it and works to unde11nine it. 
The Act has as a primary stated objective the promotion of "individual freedom''. 
1:- Much of the rhetoric surrounding the introduction and implementation of the Act was about 
freedom, in1plying in a faintly ridiculous way that those who opposed the Act were against 
freedon1. From a pluralist perspective, this is simply cynical. 
To promote unfettered individual freedom in an employment relations context is 
nothing more than to promote the freedom of the relativ~ely strong individual or organisation 
to force hotne an advantage over the relatively weaker party without fear of government 
intervention. In promoting individual freedoms that far transcend those granted in other 
representative forums, and that most employees are not in a position to use to advantage, 
the Act undern1ines lhe ability of employees to effectiv~ely act collectiv·ely when they feel 
the need to do so . 
Employment contract structures 
The distinction between individual and collective bargaining and contracting is 
reflected in bargaining structures and associated employment contract structures. though 
there is also more to structures than just that distinction. 
The En1ployment Contracts Act, at Section 18, provides as follows: 
Ncgoliations for an employment ~contract may, subject to this Act, include negotiations on any matter, 
including all or any of 1the following matters: 
(a) The question of whether employment contracts are to be individual or coUective; 
(b) The number and mix of employment conuacts to be entered into by any employer. 
These two points define the internal dimension of contract "'structme". The ex~ernal 
dimension is defined by whether contracts are multi-employer or single-employer 
documents. Detet n1ining contract structures might logically be seen as an early and 
strategically pivotal step for ~employers and employees in the process of developing new 
e1nployn1ent contracts. 
While there was some diversification of bargaining structures under the Labour 
Government's 1984 through 1990 labour market refonns, it nonetheless remained true in 
1991 that most union-repr~esented employees in New Zealand were covered by national 
multi-employer awards (Harbridge & McCaw, 1991). Most were occupational in one sense 
or the other. While there we~e relativ~ely few awards that 'Were narrowly occupational across 
industries, most awards were occupational in that, while confmed ~o a single industry, they 
did not cover all employees within the industry. As a consequence, even quite small furns 
were likely to have employees covered by three or four or more awards. 
Structurally, the point of the Employment ~Contracts Act was to replace this 
predon1inant pattern of national, occupational multi-employer awards with preferably 
individual or, if unavoidable, collective arrangements centred at the ,enterprise or sub-
enterprise levels, or perhaps extending to a parent company or group where applicable. The 
bias against multi-con1pany documents is incontrovertible, backed as it is by a ban on 
strikes in pursuit of multi-employer contracts. 
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The bias against collective contracts in general is less blatant, but is readily apparent 
from a brief comparison with the relevant legislative provisions of the North American 
collective bargaining system. 
Boxall (1990, 1991) has properly pointed out that New Zealand labour ·market 
refoinis of the past decade have, in some respects, moved the New Zealand industrial 
relations system in the direction of the North American model as practiced in the United 
States. In tetnls of structural bias on the individual versus collective dichotomy, how.ever, 
the system intended by the Employment Contracts Act is quite unlike that sponsored by the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in the United States. 
The NLRA provides for collective bargaining on a voluntary basis at the option of 
employees. A group of employees seeking to deal collectively with their employer are 
essentially entitled to do so, at their option, under law. 'They are quite likely to face a 
number of legal, technical, tactical and practical obstacles along the road to collective 
bargaining and, on occasion, the effort to bargain collectively will fail because of these. 
They are q ui ~te likely, too, to end up in a grouping or "bargaining unit,. that, as a result of 
employer input, is different than the grouping originally intended. Nonetheless, there is a 
presumption in the 'NLRA that an '"appropriate" group of employees bound together by a 
"commonality of interest", as both tettns are defined pursuant to the NLRA, is entitled to 
bargain collectively at the option of the group. 
Procedurally, the keys are the concept of a bargaining unit defining the structure of 
collective bargaining and resultant contracts, the neutral detetinination of what bargaining 
unit is appropriate in response to employee initiative and taking into account the views of 
the employer, the neutral verification of individual employee authorisation and collective 
employee election of a bargaining agent, the neutral certification of a bargaining agent for 
an indefinite period subject only decertification by the group of employees, the guarantee 
of a secret ballot on both the decision to be represented collectively and the choice of 
agent, defined limits on employer intetfelience in the ·employees' exercise of their right to 
choose, and the requirement that an employer negotiate with, and only with, the duly 
certified agent elected by the bargaining unit of employees. And undei]Jinning these 
procedural provisions are the principle of majority rule within appropriate units of 
employees and the attachment of rights to collectives, at the partial expense of unfettered 
individual rights, once the unit of employees has elected to act collectively. 
There is no pretence that this process in the United States is completely sanitised 
of all bargaining power considerations. Clearly it is not. .Nonetheless., the legislative 
framework carries the bias, based on the presumed inequality of bargaining power, that a 
group of employees who feel the need to deal collectively with their employer are entitled 
to do so. 
The provisions of the Employment Contracts Act are in stark contrast in both 
principle and procedure. The right to bargain collectively is not presumed and is available 
only by agreement of the employer. The structure of the collective "bargaining unit", if 
there is to be one, is negotiable. Bargaining agent status is fluid and revokable ~essentially 
at will. The verification of the authority of the employee's bargaining agent is in the hands 
of the employer. The decision to negotiate with the employee's agent lies with the 
en1ployer, and is revokable. The employer is free to bypass an employee collective and deal 
individually, either fron1 the outset, or subsequently if dealing with a collective proves 
difficult. And underpinning it all, even in collective bargaining settings, rights attach to 
individuals, not. to collectiv~es. 
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"'fhe in1plications of this procedural vacuun1 are that the structures of bargaining and 
contracting -- whether bargaining is to be individual or collective and, where collective, the 
shape of the covered collective -- are deteuninable largely in accord ·with the relative 
bargaining powers of the en1ployer and employee parties. But, of course, en1ployees who 
individually lack sufficient bargaining power to negotiate ef~ectively on the substance of 
their en1ployn1ent conditions, and who accordingly would be most inclined to want to 
bargain collectively, are no better placed to negotiate themselves into collective 
arrangen1ents than they are to negotiate effectiv,ely on substantive matters. 
Projecte,d structural patterns 
So what patterns of emerging bargaining and contract structures are projected by this 
essentially pluralist analysis? In the simplest teuns, the analysis would predict collective 
contracts for e·mployees with bargaining po\ver and individual contracts for those without. 
More realistically in just the first year or so under the new fran1ework, the analysis would 
predict collectivt: contracts for employees already well organised in effective unions at the 
tin1e of the implementation of the Employn1ent Contracts Act, and individual contracts for 
the rest of the workforce. 
An alternative set of projections might flo\v from the rhetorical rationale of the Act: 
bargaining and contract structures, as with substantive te1 n1s and conditions of employment, 
\vill be found to have been tailored to the needs of the immediate parties, most especially 
to their need to respond to the demands of the particular markets in which they operate. 
Of course, both the elements of contract or bargaining structure, and the range of 
circun1stances that would qualify these absolute projections, are more complex than either 
projection suggests. Walsh ( 1991) recognised many of these complexities in presenting a 
more elaborate set of projections than will be auempted here. The later discussion will 
n1ake n1ention of some of these. Clearly however, and for a variety of reasons, many 
n1anagen1ents have no interest in pressing their advantage over unorganised employees to 
the point whe~e employ~ees seek to bargain collectively. 
The discussion turns next to a brief description of the research project from which 
the data reported in the balance of the paper are drawn, follow~ed by an indication of the 
practical significance of contract structu~es, and a survey of the structural landscape revealed 
by the research. 
Tl1e research project 
The research project was designed to monitor and document how New Zealand 
en1ployers are fashioning new contractual arrangements with their employees, and perhaps 
employee representatives, during the initial year or so under the Employment Contracts Act. 
The research began in May, 1991 with a pilot study of 24 South Island finns across a 
range of industries and workforce sizes, using a nTultiple case study approach. 
'"fhe second phase of the rese~ch consisted of a mid-1992 postal swvey of a random 
sample of approxin1ately 1800 employing units across all industrial classifications, workforce 
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sizes and geographical areas of N~ew Zealand1• A total of 557 complete or substantially 
complete useable responses fo11n the basis of the data for this paper. Where precise 
percentages are used in the pr~esentation, they ~e rounded to the nearest whole number. The 
sample includes son1e state and local government enterprises, but does not include public 
service departments. A follow-up interview phase of the project was initiated in October, 
1992. 
A profile of the respo·ndents 
Most of the immediate respondents to the survey (about 70%) were the chief 
executives of their organisations. About 10% were local branch or area managers of 
employing units within larger organisations. Only about 8% were personnel or industrial 
relations managers. Most of the remainder were other senior managers. 
Of the organisations they represented, 39% were affiliat~ed, as subsidiaries, franchises 
or branches, with a parent company or group, while 61% w~elie independent organisations. 
For the most part, organisations affiliated with a larger ~oup reponed that they had either 
"con1plete" (39% of affiliated organisations) or "considerable" (48%) authority on 
employment contracting policy and practice. 
Characteristics of the firms 
The industry profile of the sample of respondents, using an expanded v~ersion of the 
Standard Industry Classification system is presented in Table One. At various points in the 
presentation, an abbreviated version of the system is used where required to allow statistical 
testing and to highlight industry sectors generally identified as critical to national economic 
recovery. 
l·here were so.rne respondents with large numbers of business locations. However, 
47% had only one location and close to 80% had less than 5 locations . About 33'% of the 
respondents had all or the largest concentration of their employees in the Auckland region; 
40% had all or the largest number of their employees elsewhere in the North Island; 27% 
had all or the largest nun1ber of their employees in the South Island. 
There were significant patterns of industrial classification by location with, for 
example, primary industry organisations mo~e likely to be in the South Island and 
n1anufacturing fitnls more likely to be in the North Island. 
There were some very large employers in the sample, with 15 respondents having 
over 500 employees covered by union-negotiated awards or agreements prior to the 
impletnentation of the Etnployn1ent Contracts Act. However, a little over 50% of the 
l 
It may be of interest and concern to other researchers to note that the New Zealand Department of 
StaListics refused to n1ake available for purchase for this project a sample from the Department's 
Business Directory. The stated reasons for the refusal was that the Department of Labour was 
commissioning a similar survey, thereby rendering this project of insufficient national imponance to 
qualify for access to a sample. Reconsiderations of the initial refusal was offered conditional on the 
survey questionnaire, amongst other material, being submitted to the Department of Statistics for 
evaluation. This offer was declined and the initial request reiterated, but no fun.her response was 
forthcoming from lhc DepartmenL 
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organisations had 25 or less employees covered by union-negotiated documents in the pre-
At:t era, \vl1ile less than 20% had more than 100. 
TABLE ()NE: THE SAMPLE BY INDUSTRY CATEGORY 
Agricultural servicing 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
Mining & quarrying 
Food & beverage n1anufacturing 
Textile manufacturing 
Wood products tnanufacturing 
Printing & publishing 
Chen1ical based manufacturing 
Metals based manufacturing 
Other manufacturing 
Electricity, water & gas supply 
Building & cons'truction 
Food retail & \Yholesale 
Non-food retail & wholesale 
Restaurants & accommodation 
Transport, storage & con1munication 
Financial & business services 
Social & personal services 
Pr~essure to reduce production costs 
Number 
14 
13 
10 
15 
9 
15 
48 
19 
37 
19 
7 
71 
24 
98 
19 
86 
29 
24 
Percentage 
2.5% 
2.3% 
1.8% 
2.7% 
1.6% 
2.7% 
8.6% 
3.4% 
6.6% 
3.4% 
1.3% 
12.7% 
4.3% 
17.6% 
3.4% 
15.4% 
5.2% 
4.3% 
Many fh rns were feeling under considerable pressure to reduce pvoduction costs, 
with two-thirds of the respondents reporting either "a great deal" or "int~ense" pressure to 
do so, and one·-half of all fu 111s reporting that the pressure was increasing. 
The sources of pressure to reduce production costs were overwhelmingly associated 
with conditions in domestic markets rather than with international competition on- or off-
shore. By \vay of illustration, 400 of the 557 respondents cited "inc1eased domestic 
co1npetition in (their) don1estic markets" as a source of pr~essure on the furn, while 389 
cited a ''reduction in don1estic demand in the markets (they) service". In contrast, only 39 
ciled a "reduction in international demand in the markets (they) service'", 85 cited ,increased 
con1petition ffon1 offshore in (their) domestic n1arkets", and 56 cit~ed "increased competition 
in international n1arkets (they) seiVice"'. 
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The significance of contract structures 
To suggest that the Employment Contracts Act has facilitated an era of widespread 
en1ployee concessions in recessed economic circumstances in New Zealand risks only 
understating the facts. A significant portion of the postal questionnaire from which the data 
reported in this paper are drawn consisted of a series of stated "pfoblems" that were seen 
by advocates of labour 1narket refotrn, amongst others, both as pfoducts of the fotmer 
industrial relations system and as detracting from productivity and perfo1rnance in New 
Zealand fim1s. Each respondent was asked to indicate whether, in fact, the "problem" had 
been seen as a problem in his or her fi1 n1, and if so, which if any of the solutions 
accompanying the problem statement were proposed and/or adopted in the transition to new 
contracts. 
As detailed elsewhere (McAndrew, forthcoming 1993), virtually all employers who 
had i1nplen1ented new contracts identified with one or usually more of the problems cited 
and had proposed and adopted various solutions. By way of illustration, restrictions on shift 
and weekend work were the most commonly mentioned problems, and expanding or 
eliminating the definition of not rnal hours and abolishing or reducing penal rates were 
among the most often proposed and adopted solutions. Not all of the solutions offered to 
all of the proble·ms posed would be viewed as employee concessions, but certainly many 
of them would and the following comments relate just to those. 
The adoption rate of concessions proposed was very impressive indeed. If an 
en1ployer proposed a concession, it was very likely to be adopted in the transition to new 
contracts. Nonetheless, employers negotiating collective ·COntracts were significantly less 
likely to have adopted concessions proposed than employers negotiating individual contracts. 
The gap was son1ewhat diminished by a hybrid model under which some employers 
compiled collective contracts by dealing individually with ~each employee to be cov~ered by 
the contract, and to a lesser ~extent by employers who dealt directly with their workforces 
as a whole rather than with representatives of the workforce. In each of these models, 
en1ployers \vere n1ore likely than those who dealt with workforce representatives to have 
achieved the concessions sought. Even so, the "adoption rate" gap between individual 
contracts and collective contracts as a whole remained at a statistically highly significant 
level. 
Consistent with these findings, employers who had put in place individual contracts 
but no collective contracts were significantly more likely than those with collective contracts 
to say that changes implemented under the Act had resulted in productivity improvements 
for their finns, and were also likely to quote a higher productivity gain. The hybrid model 
of "collective bargaining individually" again tightened the gaps somewhat, but the 
differences ren1ained significant. 
In short, dealing with employees individually resulted in a greater probability of 
en1ployee concessions and a correspondingly greater probability of perceived productivity 
in1provement than was the case if employees were dealt with collectively. 
The Employn1ent Contracts Act has, then, facilitat~ed significant reductions in labour 
costs, as well as perceived productivity improv·ement in many fn1ns, and these impacts 
clearly vary \Vith employrnent contract structures, there being marked differences between 
individual and collective contracts in these respects. The point of this paper is to examine 
whether the pattern of labour cost reductions, and attendant perceived productivity 
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in1proven1ents, corresponds to and accommodates employer needs, or is in fact dictated by 
factors less rationally based, specifically pre-Act unions strength. 
1"he structure of ne\v arrangements 
As noted early in this paper, structurally, the point of the Employment Contracts Act 
\vas to replace the predominant pattern. of national, occupational multi-employer awards with 
arrangen1ents centred at the enterprise or sub-enterprise levels. To a very considerable 
extent, this has been accomplished in the frrst year or so under the Act, as the following 
n1ajor points profile of the 557 organisations in the survey begins to illustrate: 
* 90 fim1s reported having some or all employees still covered by a current award, 
agreen1ent. or contract pre-dating the Act; 
* 207 futns had some or all employees on individual contracts under the tetrns of 
expired awards, agreements or contracts; 
* 234 firms had some or all employ,ees on new or renewed individual contracts 
developed under the Act 
* 229 fim1s had some or all employees on new or renewed ~collective contracts 
developed under the Act 
* 53 additional finns were working towards a new collective contract for some or 
all employees 
A simple addition of these numbers suggests lhat the pattern is not an entirely tidy one. 
Many respondents reported a mix of arrangen1ents for different employees or groups of 
employees. 
A total of 73 organisations reported having no employees on either new contracts 
or award tem1s. Many of these reported that they were in the process of developing new 
contracts, and had varied some award te1n1s in the meanwhile. Others had had no 
ernployees under union-negotiated documents in the pre-Act period and had modified but 
not fom1alised pre-existing arrangements. 
Co'llective contra~cts: the external structur,e 
As has been established elsewhere (Harbridge & Moulder, 1992; Department of 
Labour, 1992), on the ~external dimension, the structure of collective documents has 
effectively been reversed. Of the 557 organisations in the survey, 491 had one or more 
en1ployees covered by union negotiated docun1ents at the time the Employment Contracts 
Act \vas in1plemented. Table Two shows a structural comparison of the documents covering 
the largest number of employees in each of those organisations before the Act (early 1991) 
\vith the major new docutnents in those 229 finns with new collective contrncts in place 
at the tin1e of the surv~ey. · 
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TABLE TWO: PROFILE OF COLLECTIVE DOCUMENT STRUCTURES 
Percentage of futus 
I Major collective document in the fn1n 
Early 1991 Mid 1992 
A national or near-national award 80% 10% 
A regional or local award 8% 2% 
A contract exclusive to the fnn1 9% 80% 
A contract exclusive to the parent company 3% 8% 
Collective contracts: the i·nternal structure 
Internally, collective contract structur,es have also changed quit~e dramatically. 
,Overwhelmingly (186 of 229), fespondents who deal with any collective contracts now deal 
with only one . An additional 30 organisations reported having 2 applicable collective 
contracts, 7 reported having 3, and only the remaining handful reponed having more than 
3 collective contracts applicable to the fespondent employing unit Second and subsequent 
collective contracts were, on the external dimension, almost entirely enterprise based. 
Some additional structural characteristics of the major (and, as noted, usually the 
only) collective contract in the organisation aJie of interest. In 124 of the 229 organisations, 
all classes of employees previously fepresented under union-negotiated documents had been 
brought together under the collective contract. In most of the rest, coverage extended only 
to "production" en1ployees, with support personnel either ~excluded or, in a minority of 
cases, covered under a second or subsequent collective contract Conespondingly, such 
supplementary coll~ective contracts, where they existed, ·were more likely than the major 
contract to exclusively cover support staff of one type or another. 
In 109 of the 229 organisations, the major or only collective contract covered 25 or 
fewer en1ployees., with only 33 contracts covering more than 100 employees. As might be 
expected, the percentages of second and subsequent contracts that covered 25 or less 
employees were progressively higher. 
About one-half of the major collective contracts (114 of 229), and of the second and 
subsequent contracts as well, included some supetvisory or management employees in 
coverage. 
In 133 of the 229 organisations, some (in 22 fn1ns) or usually all (in 111 furns) 
en1ployees covered by the major collective contract had second-tier individual contracts or 
letters of appointment as well, spelling out individual pay rates, work schedules or other 
conditions of employment. This was significantly less likely to be the case in second and 
subsequent collective contracts within an organisation. 
Finally on the internal structural dimension, 42 of the 229 organisations had one or 
n1ore en1ployees in classifications generally covered by the major collective contract on 
individual contracts outside the scope of the coHective. This was somewhat more likely to 
be the case for second and subsequent collective contracts. With a few exceptions, the 
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nun1bers of employees so separated from their colleagues generally represented quite small 
percentages of the covered classes. 
Examining structural patterns 
To examine contract or bargaining structures in tet ans of the analysis presented 
earlier in the paper, or to identify alternative explanations, several elements of structure 
were tested against organisational, market, and pre-Act labour relations characteristics. 
Respondent organisations were categorised on one principal and three secondary 
strucrural din1ensions: 
1) Contract status: organisations (n=557) were categorised as ~either: 
a) having employ~ees exclusively on pre-Act award (or other document) tetins, 
whether curr~ent or expired (n=ll4); 
b) having at least some employees on new (or renewed) individual contracts 
developed under the Act, but no employees on new (or renewed) collective contracts 
(n=l41); 
c) having no employees on either new (or renewed) contracts or pre-Act award (or 
other document) tetrns (n=73); or 
d) having at least some employees on new (or renewed) collectiv~e contracts 
developed under the Act (n=229). 
In pure fonn, the pluralist analysis presented at the outset of this paper would 
suggest collective contracts for employees strongly unionised at the time of the 
implementation of the Act, and individual contracts for the rest of the workforce. Categories 
a) and c) are more ambiguous, there being a variety of possible explanations for employees 
being in either status, and a variety of fmal destinations towards which they might be 
headed. 
There are, of course, qualifiers to this projection as noted earlier. Walsh (1991:168-
169) suggests "workers who possess skills or expertise in shon supply, or whose experienc~e 
or particular abililies make them ~essential to their organisation"', as well as those in secu~e 
relationships in some small workplaces as en1ployees who may voluntarily seek individual 
rather than collective contracts. And he also outlines some limited circumstances under 
which some employers n1ight seek collective rather than individual arrangements. No doubt 
there are others as well. 
2) Type of collective contract (or the contract covering the largest number of the 
organisations employees in cases where more than one new collective contract has been 
developed): organisations (n=229) were categorised as having either: 
a) a collective contract exclusive to either the immediate or a parent organisation 
(n=201); or 
b) a multi-en1ployer collective contract (n=28) 
''Type of collective contract." is included here as only a secondary structural 
din1ension for a couple of reasons. First, under the influence of the Act, multi-employer 
contracts are relatively rare and the numbers may be insufficient to establish any reliable 
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patterns. Second, particularly under circumstances where collective contracts might seem 
inevitable, either en1ployers or unions may prefer multi-employer documents for their own 
reasons. 
A purely pluralist analysis would suggest that the strongest unions would seek multi-
en1ployer documents to remove labour costs as a factor in competition to the extent that 
this remains feasible in the current market and legislative environments. 
~On the other hand, previous rese~ch (McAndrew & Hursthouse, 1990) has suggested 
that many small and n1edium-sized f11rns were happy with the remoteness and convenience 
of the pre-Act awafd system, and some may seek to retain those advantages. Or, as noted 
by Walsh (1991: 172), there are likely to be still circumstances where employers want 
wages and conditions taken out of competition, and where they seek to do this through 
multi-employer contracts. And, he suggests, there may be industry sectors, such as the dairy 
industry, where a small number of major employers see advantages in coordinating their 
labour relations activities through a strong central body. 
3) Number of collective contracts: organisations (n=229) wefe categorised as having either: 
a) one collectiv~e contract (n= 186); or 
b) two or more collective contracts (n=43). 
Again, while the number of collective contracts is of interest and may be instructive, 
this dimension is included as only a secondary structural dimension, again for essentially 
the same two reasons. First, the number of respondents with more than one collective 
contract is small. S~econd, multiple contracts may be at the instigation of either employers 
or en1ployees. Walsh (1991: 170) suggests that employees may push for multiple ~contracts 
"where dissimilar groups are bound into the same document and believe their particular 
needs can best be furthered by a series of collec'ti ve contracts"'. 
On the other hand, there is a considerable body of literature that suggests that, most 
obviously in large frm1s, decentralising of collective bargaining and contracts to the level 
of the individual plant or cost ~centre, resulting in multiple contracts, is an imponant 
managerial strategy both for generating productivity wough internal competition and for 
insulating major decisions from union influence (Kochan, McKersie & Cappelli, 1984; 
McKersie, 1987; Kinnie, 1987). 
4) Second tier individual contracts: organisations (n=229) were categorised as having either; 
a) no employees covered by collective contracts also on second tier individual 
contracts (n=96); or 
b) some or all en1ployees covered by collective contracts also on second tier 
individual contracts (n=133). 
Again, where this practice is found, there can be no absolute certainty who initiated 
it. Walsh (1991: 167), for example, suggests that employees may seek second tier individual 
contracts to "pursue particular issues either not covered in the collective contract, or dealt 
with unsatisfactorily'', and would certainly be likely to do so in preference to having an 
individual contract alone. 
A conventional pluralist analysis, on the other hand, would have employers initiating 
this practice to facilitate individual perfonnance based compensation and perhaps conditions; 
to enhance flexibility through individual schedules and conditions; and tactically, to reduce 
the cohesion of the workforce in collectiv~e bargaining. Perhaps for all of these reasons, but 
• 
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particularly the last, unions could be expected to resist the practice, strong unions most 
successfully. 
To test the projections drawn from pluralist analysis, and to sewch for explanations 
where the analysis offers either competing or no specific projections, these structural 
di1nensions \Vere examined in relation to a number of organisational variables and against 
several pre-Act labour relations variables. 
Organisational variab'les 
The structural di n1ensions ·were examined against the following organisational 
variables: ( 1) the size of the workforce, as measured by the total number of the respondent 
• 
organisation's employees covered by union-negotiated documents in the pre-Act era; (2) the 
industrial classification or main business of the organisation; and (3) the sources and ext·ent 
of felt pressure to reduce production costs. 
A nun1ber of other organisational variables, including whether the organisation was 
affiliated with a larger organisation or was independent, the number of plaoes of business, 
and the gender makeup of the workfooce were also looked at, but found to be related to 
one or another of the three principal variables. Accordingly, these subsidiary characteristics 
are mentioned only occasionally for particular points of interest in the following discussion. 
Size of the workforce 
Patterns of contract status were apparent by workfofce size, both in te1n1s of the 
likelihood of having made any new fo1 xnal contractual arrangements and in terxns of the 
structure of those new arrangements. Specifically, respondents with workforces of 25 or less 
~en1ployees were much more likely than larger organisations to report that they had not yet 
put new contracts in place, either leaving employees on pre-Act awanl tetxns or varying 
those tei 1ns without fo1 ntalising new contracts. 
Employers with 25 or fewer employees who had introduc.ed new contracts were less 
likely than larger employers to hav.e collective contracts, and coitespondin,gly more likely 
to have introduced individual contracts. Employers with workforces in the 26 to 50 
employees range were also more likely than larger fil1ns to have introduced new individual 
contracts. 
Amongst those organisations with collective contracts, a somewhat higher percentage 
of fit n1s \Vith 25 or less employees weJie covered by multi-employer documents than was 
the case with larger frm1s. 
There was a pliedictable pattern to the number of collective contracts in those 
organisations with any collective contracts. Smaller fi1 n1s were even more likely than others 
to have just one. 
Respondent fii n1s with 50 or less employees showed a higher propensity than larger 
finns to supplement collective conrracts with second tier individual contracts, and the 
practice dropped off noticeably with workfofces of over 100. 
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Industrial classifi~cation 
There were industrial patterns to all four of the structural dimensions described 
above. Contract status by industry is illustrated in Table Three. 
TABLE THREE: CONTRACT STRUCTIJRES BY INDUSTRY SECTOR (n::5S7) 
PRIMARY1 MANUFACJ'l BUTI...DlNG3 RETAIL" TRANSPOR~ OTHER6 
(n=37) (n=162) (n=71) (n=l41) (n=86) (n=60) 
New IECs7, No 7 31 21 37 27 18 
CECs1 (19%) (19%) (30%) (26%) (31%) (30%) 
I 
9 88 17 .56 37 22 
New CECs (24%) (54%) (249'o) (40%) (43%) (37%) 
Award Terms 13 25 14 31 13 18 
Onl)~ (359'o) (1.5%) (20%) 
' 
(22%) ( 15o/o) (30lfo) 
No Contracts or 8 18 19 17 9 2 
Awaros I 
I 
(22%) (11%) 
' 
(279'o) (12%) (lOCfo) (3%) 
I 
Notes: 1. Includes the agriculrure. hunting. forestry or fishin& and the mining and quanyi.ng industrial classifications. 2. The manufacrurina 
indusoial classifications. 3 . The building and constrUCtion classification. 4. The wholesale or retail trad~ or restaurants or hotels 
classification. 5. The transport stouge or comrm.D"l.iCJ!tinn ~classification. 6. Includes the business or fmanciaJ services. community, social 
or personal services. nnd t.he clecLricity, gas or wa1cf supply industrial classifications. Includes many public entetprises. 7. IEC c 
individual employment contracts. 8. CEC =collective enployment contracts 9. Includes pre-Act enterprise agreements and individual 
arrangements in fums which had no employees coveted by union-negotiated documents. 
.. 
I 
It is apparent from the table that the primary and construction sectors have acted 
with least urgency in putting new contractual arrangements in place, with high percentages 
of fi1n1s in these two categories either retaining employees exclusively on the terms of 
previous awards or acknowledging no fottnal contractual ammgements at all. Employers in 
the manufacturing, retail and transpon sectors, and in parts of the "other" category have 
been most proactive in implementing new contracts, and are also most likely to have 
developed new collective contracts. 
Some interesting, more detailed data are available within the abbreviated list of 
industry categories in the table, particularly in relation to ~collective contracts. For example, 
in the printing and publishing industry, 33 of 48 respondents (69%) reported having 
collective contracts. Within the broad manufacturing sector, textile manufacturers were more 
likely than o'thers to have reported collective contracts. 
Amongst those respondents with collective contracts, the type of collective contract 
in the organisation sho\ved industrial patterns. Most noteworthy was an even greater 
propensity in manufacturing than in other sectors to have put in place a contract exclusive 
to the organisation. Fully 88% of responding manufacturers with collective arrangements 
had enterprise contracts. 
The retail and transport sectors showed a somewhat higher propensity than others 
for group or parent cornpany contracts, and the retail sector a higher propensity than others 
for multi-employer contracts. Close to 20o/o of respondents with collective arrangements in 
the retail sector were covered by national multi-employer contracts and 68% had enterprise 
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docun1ents. Within this sector, however, food retailers had only enterprise documents, with 
the non-food retail and restaurant and accommodation sub-sectors accounting for the group 
and multi-employer arrangements. 
The heavy count of collective contracts in the printing and publishing sector noted 
abov~e consisted aln1ost exclusively of enterprise documents. 
Though the patterns were less vivid, industrial classification was also related to the 
number of collective contracts in those organisations with any collective contracts. In teiins 
of the broad categories, the primary, manufacturing and building and construction sectors 
were even more likely than others to have just the one document. 
Finally, there was a ~clear industrial configuration to the use of second tier individual 
contracts t.o supplen1ent collective contracts, with this practice markedly most prevalent in 
non-~ood retail and in printing and publishing, and least prevalent in the primary and 
transport sectors. The application of second tier individual contracts to only some employees 
covered by a collective contract, rather than to all or none, was particularly popular only 
in non-food retailing. 
Production cost pressures 
There is a good deal of literature suggesting that product market structures and 
pressures substantially influence n1anagerial indusnial relations policies, including on the 
question of contract structu'fe. In a vague way,, publicists for the Employment Contracts Act 
en1braced this view. There is also a countervailing body of literature that suggests that 
managen1ent in fact retains considerable room to make strategic industrial relations 
decisions, almost regwdless of mark~et pressures, perhaps subject to other limiting factors 
(see generally: Deaton & Beaumont, 1980; Marchington, 1990). 
Analysed in isolation from other variables, no discemable patterns w~elie found 
between either the level or source of felt pressures to reduce production costs and any of 
the structural variables. To illustrat~e the point, Table Four presents the apparently etiatic 
distribution of contract structures by felt pressulie. 
Industrial Relations Char,a~cteristics 
In addition to the organisational characteristics dealt with above, the data were 
examined for any relationships between the several dimensions of contract structure and a 
nun1ber of industrial relations characteristics of the respondent organisations in the period 
leading up to 'the implementation of the Employment Contracts Act in May, 1991. 
The industrial relations variables tested were (1) the natllfe of the union-negotiated 
document (and whether there was one) covering the largest number of the organisation's 
en1ployees in the pre-Act period; (2) the pre-Act percentage of union membership among 
~etnployees covered by that document, as estimated by the respondent; and (3) whether the 
respondent perceived "outside union interfefence" to have been a problem for the 
organisation in the period before the Act. 
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TABLE FOUR: CONTRACT STRUCTURE BY PRODUCTION COST PRESSURES (n=S57) 
I 
Level of pressure to reduce production costs 
Little or none Some A great deal Intense 
(n=14) (n=l8l) (n=222) (n=l40) 
New IE~Cs, No ~CECs1 1 47 54 39 
(7%) (26%) (24%) (28%) 
I 
New CECs 8 68 102 51 
(57%) (38%) (46%) (36%) 
Award Terms Only2 4 42 44 24 
(29%) (23%) (20%) (17%) 
No Contracts or A wards I 24 22 26 
I (7%) (13%) (10%) (19%) 
I 
' 
1. IEC = individual employment contract; CEC = collective employment contract. 2. Includes pre-Act enterprise 
agreements unchanged and individual arr.angements in fmns which had no employees covered by union negotiated 
documents. 
The major pre-Act ~document 
In the period I~eading up to the implementation of the Employment Contracts Act, 
all but 66 respondent organisations had employees subject to union-negotiared awards or 
agiieernents. As indicated previously, in most instances the document covering the largest 
number of the f11tn,s employees was a national or near-national award. In smaller numbers 
of cases it was a regional or local award, an enterprise agreement or an agreement that 
extended to other employing units within a parent organisation, but no further. 
The pattern of current contract status by pre-Act document structures is illustrated 
in Table Five. 
Some of the figures in 'Table Five are not unexpected. ~Organisations which had no 
collective coverage before the Act are least likely to have collective covernge now. Those 
that had collective arrangements in place within the immediate or extended company before 
the Act are most likely to still have collective contracts, mostly renegotiated and possibly 
restructufed. 
Of interest, and perhaps less predictable, is the relatively high dissipation of local 
and regional awards into individual arrangements, by comparison with awa.Iids of broader 
coverage. 
I 
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TABLE FIVE: CONTRACT STRU,CTURE BY MAJOR PRE-ACT 
DOCUMENT (N=557) 
National Regional Ent~erprise Parent Co. No 
Award Award Agreement Agreement Collective 
(n=392) (n=40) (n-44) (n=l5) Document 
(n=66) 
I 
New IECs, No CECs1 I 88 16 7 I 1 29 
I {22o/o) (40%) (16o/o) (7%) (44%) 
New CECs 172 12 22 9 14 
(44%) (30%) (50%) (60%) (21%) 
A.ward Tenns Onlf 82 11 9 4 8 
I (21%) (28%) (20%) (27%) (12%) 
No Contracts or A wards 50 1 6 1 15 
(l3o/o) (2o/o) (14%) (7%) (23%) 
1. IEC = individual employment contract; CEC = oollective ·employment contract 2. Includes pre-.Act enterprise agreements 
unchanged and individual arrangements in fmns which had no employees covered by union negotiated documents. 
There were also some int~eresting patterns to the type of collective contract currently 
in place in those organisations with ~collectives, by comparison with pre-Act documents. 
Within the overall new pattern dominated by ~enterprise-based ~collectives, several points are 
wonh noting. Predictably, firms with pre-Act in-house ~collective arrangements that have 
retained a collective contract approach still favour this structure. On the other hand, 
amongst those reporting new or renewed collectives, one-third of the organisations covered 
before the Act by parent company documents have now decentralised to enterprise contracts. 
To the limited ~extent that they are covered by new ~collectiv~e arrangements at all, 
two groups are covered almost exclusively by enterprise documents: those without any pre-
Act collective coverage and those covered pre-Act by local or regional awards. 
In teuns of the number of collective contracts in place in those organisations with 
any collectives, fhrns with pre-Act enterprise agreements were far more likely than others 
to be in the minority of organisations with more than one collective contract. 
Finally on this variable, somewhat smaller percentages of organisations with either 
enterprise or parent con1pany collective documents before the Act reported having second 
tier individual contracts, by comparison with ,all other categories .. 
Pre-Act union membership 
With reference to the pre-Act document applicable to the largest number of their 
en1ployees, respondents wefe asked what percentage of their employees covered by that 
document were union n1embers prior to the implementation of the Act. As noted piieviously, 
66 respondents had no en1ployees covered by union-negotiated documents before the Act 
I 
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Of those that did, 43 could not offer a union membership figure, while 448 were prepared 
to do so. 
As illustrat~ed in Table Six, there was a marked relationship between the reponed 
percentage of union n1en1bership and cutient contract status. 
'TABLE SIX: CONTRACT STRU·CTURES BY PRE-ACT UNION 
MEMBERSHIP (N=448) 
0% 1-25% 26-50% 51-75% 
(n=28) (n=31) (n=41) I (n=41) 
I 
New IECs, No CECs1 8 16 8 15 
I (29%) (52%) (20%) (37%) 
New ~CECs 8 9 11 15 
(29%) (29%) (27%) (37%) 
A ward Tertns Only2 5 3 15 9 
(18%) (10%) (37%) (22%) 
No Contracts or A wards 7 3 7 2 
(25%) (10%) (17%) (5%) 
76-100% 
(n=307) 
58 
(19%) 
152 
(50%) 
66 
(21%) 
31 
(10%) 
I 
i 
1. IEC = individual employment. contract; CEC = collective employment contracL 2. Includes pre-Act eruerprise agreements 
unchanged. 
It would be an exaggerntion to suggest that there are clear and consistent trend lines 
running through the data in Table Six. Nonetheless, it is apparent that workforces with high 
(76 - 100%) union me.mbership before the implementation of the Employment ~Contracts 
Act, and even those with merely majority (51 -75%) union membership, are more likely 
than those with minority union membership to now have collectiv~e contracts. 
The percentage of pre-Act union membership also showed a relationship to the type 
of collective contract in place in those organisations with collective contracts. Most apparent 
within the nevJ patt~ern of predominantly enterprise based collective contracts was the greater 
tendency for workforces with less than 75·% union membership to be in the minority 
covered by multi-employer documents. To illustrate the point, workforces with high (76 -
IOOo/o) union rnen1bership constituted about 75% of those with new or renewed collective 
contract coverage, but accounted for less than 50o/o of multi-employer document coverage 
reported. 
Respondents reporting high (76 - 100%) union membership were somewhat more 
likely than others to report having more than one collective contract. They were also 
n1arkedly less likely than others to report having second tier individual contracts 
supplen1enting collective contracts. 
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Outside union interference 
Respondents were asked whether "outside union interference in the relationship 
between management and staff' had been seen as a problem in the organisation prior to the 
in1plementation of the Employment Contracts Act. One-third of ~espondents said that it had 
been a problem; two-thirds said that it had not. 
Those that had seen unions as a problem in the past were more likely than others 
to have implemented new contractual arrangements of one type or another, and were very 
n1uch less likely to have employees in the limbo status of "neither new contract nor old 
award~~. 
Those that had seen unions as a problem in the past were also much more likely 
than the others to have collective ~contracts now. Of those that had collective contracts, 
en1ployers who had not been botheJied by unions in the past were more likely to be among 
the minority of respondents that w,ere parties to multi-employer contracts. 
There was no apparent pattern to the number of collective contracts in those 
organisations with collective contraC'ts by past perceived union interference. Nor was there 
a link between perceptions of union interference in the past and the likelihood of having 
second tier individual contracts. 
The secondary structural variables 
In the earlier analysis, less confident projections welie drawn in relation to what we~e 
identified as secondary structural variables than was so in relation to new contract status. 
The evidence on each of the foJ ,aner can be briefly ~examined befolie looking in more depth 
at the latter. 
Type of collective contract 
The ·minority of ·furns linked to multi-employer documents can be relatively easily 
profiled. Multi-employer contracts exist in a number of industries, the building industry in 
the south of the South Island being one example. However, almost 75% of the surveyed 
finns which were party to mul.ti-employer documents were in either the manufacturing or 
retail sectors. Most had small workforces, less than high levels of pre-Act union 
men1bership, and no pre-Act problems of union interference. And most w,ere in one of 
several multi-employer documen'ts negotiated by the Engineers Union. 
These fuxns would appear to be those that are left of the large numbers of 
en1ployers identified in ~earlier research (McAndrew & Hursthouse, 1990, 1991) as quite 
happy with the remoteness and convenience of the pr~e-Act aw~d system and prepared to 
con1pete on the basis of something other than labour rates. It should be acknowledged that 
today's rnulti-en1ployer documents tend to hav,e considerable enterprise flexibility. As such, 
they perfot rn essentially the same non-intrusiv~e role for these employers as did minimum-
rate awards in the time before the Employment Contracts Act. 
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Number of collective contracts 
The data leads to little more than speculation regarding the minority of furns with 
multiple collective contracts. However, the facts that they are likely to hav~e sizeable 
workforces and to have had high union memberships, and that they were likely to have had 
inhouse collective agreen1ents befo~e the Act are suggestive. The profile, though sketchy, 
is not inconsistent with a small number of more sophisticated firms acting strat~egically in 
a manner suggested by the Kochan et. al. literatu~e referenced earlier. While the Act may 
have facilitated their strategies, most had been moving forward before its implementation. 
Second tier individual contracts 
The evidence on the incidence of second tier individual contracts is inconclusive. 
The practice is very widespread among fun1s with collectiv~e contracts, in some indusnies 
more than others. It is most prevalent among the smallest fntns with lowest union 
membership and least prevalent among larger finns with high union membership, and 
particularly among those that were pursuing ~enterprise strategies before the implementation 
of the Act. 
It may be tempting to claim support for the pluralist contention that strong unions 
won't stand for fragmentation of the workforce through the device of individual second tier 
contracts. On the other hand, to the extent that there is a pattern, it may reflect nothing 
more than a continuation of the long standing and previously documented practice in many 
sn1all fitnts of paying above-award individual rates (McAndrew & Hursthouse, 1991). 
Explaining contract status 
Relative to what has been tetrned here "contract status", ·the analysis pliesented early 
in the paper projected that the Employment Contracts Act, by withholding support for 
collective bargaining, ·would lead to collective contracts amongst workforces well organised 
in effective unions at the time of the implementation of the Act, but not often amongst 
other workforces. 
By the implication that pre-existing union strength would be the detetrnining factor, 
it was projected that the pattern of contract status under the .Act would be ~essentially 
unrelated to the particular needs or circumstances of the parties that featured so strongly 
in the rhetoric surrounding the introduction of the Act. Pressure to reduce production costs 
is the variable most closely identified with employer needs. 
To sort through the variables, most of which show~ed patterns apparently associated 
with contract status, each of the contract status cat~egories were tested using logistic 
regression analysis, with stepwise entry of variables. Except as noted, probability values 
were at the .01 level or better for each of the significant relationships r~eported below. 
The only variables found to have value in predicting that an organisation would have 
en1ployees in the "lin1bo" status of neither prior award nor new contract cov~erage were, in 
order of importance, the size of the workforce and the perception of union interference as 
having been a problern for the organisation in the past. 
• 
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It n1ight reasonably be suggested that the perception of union interfe~ence as a 
problem in the past appears to have been a motivating factor in employers proactively 
moving to implement new arrangements, particularly in larger futns. lnt~erestingly, beyond 
that point, union interference had no explanatory value in te1rns of the structure of the new 
a.rrangen1ents. 
None of the variables had any value as a predictor of furns still having employees 
exclusively on the t~e1n1s of pre-Act awards or agreements. 
Two variables, pel'centage pre-Act union membership and workforce size, in that 
order, \vere predictive of an organisation having new individual contracts but no collective 
contracts. The same two variables, in reverse order of impact, were predictive of new 
collective contracts. In short, individual contracts were most likely in small fit n1s with low 
pre-Act union memberships, while collective contracts wer~e most likely amongst larger 
workforces with high pre-Act union memberships. 
Of the variables tested, the nature of the major pre-Act document prov~ed 
insignificant. More interestingly, neither industry ~classification nor pressure to reduce 
production costs, as whol~e variables, had predictive value relative to ~contract status. A 
br~eakdown of the industry variable revealed links between the building and construction 
industry and the "neither old awaro nor new contract" status, and betw~een the primary 
sector and the expired award status, though probability values were comparatively weak in 
both cases. Industry classification had no other predictive value. And neither the source nor 
the intensity of felt pressur~es to reduce production costs had any explanatory value in 
relation to contract status or structures. 
Conclusions 
The conclusions to this paper should be read quite narrowly. It is accept~ed, for 
example, that some restructuring and decentralisation of the labour relations system away 
fro·m national occupational awa.Iids was necessary. At a substantive l~evel, it is accepted, too, 
that son1e widespread work and compensation practices are probably as inappropriate to 
modem New Zealand as they wefe appropriate when initially agreed to decades ago. 
The central thesis of the analysis presented early in this paper was that the 
Employn1ent Contracts Act would be ineffective in tailoring labour relations arrangements, 
and hence employment contracting and its outcomes, to the needs and circumstances of 
particular workplaces. To a considerable extent, it was suggested, the Act would be shown 
to have simply tailored labour relations arrangements in accord with pre-existing union 
strengths and weakness~es, regardless of the productivity needs of the enterprise. 
The data lend substantial suppon to this thesis. As previously note-d, the levels of 
concession taking, of labour cost reduction and of pen:eived productivity improvement are 
directly tied to new contract structures, and particularly to the individual versus collective 
contract din1ension. Crudely put, more concessions have been extract~ed from workforces that 
have been n1oved onto individual contracts than from those that have retained collective 
contract coverage. This will not, of course, be universally so. But it held true as a general 
rule across organisations in this sample, and at a statistically highly significant level. 
Yet~ of the severnl organisational variables tested, only workforce size is link~ed to 
contract status, a teun used here to embrace both proactivity in implementing new 
contractual arrangements as well as the structure of new contracts and of the bargaining that 
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produced them. Contract status, contract structures, the level of employee conGessions, and 
perceived productivity improvements are unrelated, and presumably unresponsiv·e to the 
needs of employing organisations to reduce production costs; and, somewhat surprisingly, 
but consistently, they we essentially unrelated even to industry classification. 
To illustrate the point, the figures in Table Four, for example, reveal that furns 
subject to some, little or no production cost pressures, on the one hand, and those with a 
great deal or intense pressure to reduce p:nxiuction costs, on the other, each adopted 
individual contracts in about 25% of cases and each adopted collective contracts in about 
40% of cases. In sun1, the data suggest that the patterns of adjustment under the 
En1ployment Contracts Act bear no relationship to either the markets in which employing 
organisations operate or the positions of organisations in their markets . 
In the short tenn, this unhelpful pattern is effectively hidden because, under the 
influence of the ongoing economic malaise, the survey results indicate that virtually all 
employers who have implemented new contracts have been able to use the Act to revise 
tenns and conditions of ·employment to some degree in a <fuection more to their liking. 
There is considerable support in the data for the initial projection that, under the 
Employment Contracts Act, employees well organised in effective unions at the time of the 
implementation of the Act would secure for themselves ~collective ·Contracts, and the greater 
resistance to concessions that collective bargaining brings, while employees not so well 
organised before the Act took effect would most likely be found faring less well on 
individual arrangements. 
Two union variables have featured in the analysis: union membership and the 
perception of unions as a problem in the past. It was envisioned that the union interference 
variable might reflect the local visibility and activity level of the union and, as such, be a 
useful measure of some necessary ingredients for union effectiveness in the new 
environment. It is not entirely clear what, in fact, this variable measures. Its apparent role 
in ·motivating employers to fottnalise new arrangements of one type or another could be 
·consistent with either union interference as a proxy for union effectiveness or union 
interference as simply a nuisance to be avoided by early attention to new contracts. As 
noted, the union interference variable did not feature further as a factor in the structme of 
new contracts. 
On the other hand, union men1bership strength was, along with workfofce size, an 
important predictor of whether an organisation has collective or individual contracts. As 
predicted, workforces with high union membership before the Employment Contracts Act 
took effect are significantly more likely than others to now have collective contracts, and 
accordingly to have sacrificed least by ·way of concessions to employers, regardless of either 
the ~employer ·' s need for concessions or the workforce's capacity to absorb them. 
To conclude, the Employment Contracts Act licensed wholesale concession taking 
from employees, prornpted by the legitimate and widely recognised need to improve 
productivity in many New Zealand workplaces through a restructuring of labour relations, 
but unrestrained by any recognition of the legitin1ate rights of employees to be repfesenred 
effectively in the process. With a bottomless labour market and few statutory minima, 
employer responsibility and self-restraint and the industrial strength of particularly larger 
workforces have been the only moderating influences. 
Statistical analysis indicates relationships and trends, not absolutes. Clearly, 
significant numbers of en1ploy~ers ., even absent industrially strong workforces, have fashioned 
new contractual arrangernents and new tei n1s of en1ployment in tailored reaction to their 
particular circumstances, with or without en1ploye~e input, but with an appreciation of 
.. 
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employee needs. This sagacity of many New Zealand managements should not be 
understated or undervalued. 
The evidence of this paper is, however, that these factors have been insufficient to 
prevent an overall pattern of concession taking that bears virtually no relationship to the 
differing market circumstances of New Zealand businesses. It is difficult 'to imagine that 
either the non-rational pattern of concession taking or the demonstration effect of industrial 
strength as the best defence will escape the attention of the greater New Zealand workforce. 
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